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NATO emerged from its 19-20 November 
2010 Lisbon Summit with a new Strategic 
Concept (SC) that is concise and readable. 
That is an achievement in its own right, as 
those  who  in  preparing  for  the  Summit 
struggled  through  the  previous  long-
winding 1999 version will appreciate. The 
new text does not break a daring new path 
for NATO nor does it bridge any age-old 
divide,  which  perhaps  explains  why 
attention from the media and the general 
public outlasted the Summit itself by just a 
day or two. Even so the Summit can be 
deemed  successful,  for  NATO  needed  a 
new  and  clear  mission  statement,  as  the 
public,  and  many  governments,  were 
growing  restive  about  Afghanistan,  and 
were  beginning  to  doubt  whether  that 
seemingly never-ending war did not put a 
mortgage  on  the  Alliance’s  reason  for 
living: the collective defence of its territory. 
The  new  Strategic  Concept  provides  the 
answers  that  were  to  be  expected.  Of 
course,  NATO  must  be  capable  of  both 
Article 5, i.e. territorial defence, and non-
Article 5, i.e. worldwide crisis management 
operations.  Evidently,  the  Alliance  must 
remain committed to nuclear disarmament 
while maintaining nuclear deterrence as a 
core  element  of  Article  5:  “As  long  as 
nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain 
a nuclear Alliance” (SC §17). Naturally, it is 
better to have a “strong and constructive 
partnership with Russia” (SC §34) than to 
steer  an  antagonistic  course —  Russia’s 
own  interpretation  of  that  will  become 
clear soon enough. The Strategic Concept 
offers  a  neat  expression  of  NATO’s 
mission and how it seeks to go about it in 
the years to come. 
And yet, a forceful Strategic Concept has 
not generated a self-confident Alliance, and 
not  just  because  at  the  same  time  as 
strategizing  NATO  had  to  down-size a s  
well. The NATO structure will be cut from 
some 13,000 to some 8,000 personnel. The 
much  more  fundamental  reason  for  the 
existential unease that marks NATO today 
is  its  loss  of  centrality.  The  Strategic 
Concept contains a number of ambiguities 
as a consequence of trying to reconcile two 
ways of dealing with this loss of centrality: 
staying relevant by strengthening the core 
business, or staying relevant by adding new 
business lines. 
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THE  POLITICAL  CENTRE  OF  GRAVITY 
HAS SHIFTED 
 
As  long  as  the  Cold  War  lasted,  it  was 
logical for defence against the vital military 
threat  to  the  territorial  integrity  of  the 
Allies to be high on the political agenda, 
hence  the  centrality  of  NATO  in  the 
multilateral relations of Europe and North 
America.  Now  that  there  no  longer  is  a 
vital  threat,  it  is  equally  logical  for 
territorial  defence  and  the  Alliance  that 
organizes it to lose that central position, as 
other issues rise to the top of the agenda: 
climate  change,  energy  scarcity,  global 
economic  and  financial  governance,  the 
role of the emerging powers. These are not 
threats,  entailing  an  immediate  risk  of 
violence,  but  challenges.  They  cannot  be 
tackled  by  military  means,  but  require  a 
mix of diplomatic, economic, technological 
and  other  instruments.  In  short,  this  is 
foreign policy — not defence. 
The gradual shift of the political centre of 
gravity  away  from  NATO  should  not  be 
resisted.  While  unpleasant  perhaps  for 
NATO, it is in fact a luxury problem: there 
are no more vital threats to our territory, 
hence  we  can  afford  to  prioritize  other 
issues. NATO is not equipped to deal with 
those — NATO cannot do foreign policy. 
Trying  to  keep  NATO  relevant  by 
artificially forcing all of these issues onto 
its agenda is counter-productive, for as the 
Alliance will not be able to solve them it 
only risks being discredited without hope 
of  achieving  success.  At  the  same  time, 
means and efforts will be distracted from 
its core business of territorial defence and 
crisis  management,  which  does  in  fact 
ensure NATO’s relevance — only in a less 
central position that before. 
That  does  not  mean  that  NATO  cannot 
discuss climate change or energy scarcity, 
but only in so far as they have implications 
for security and defence. Nor does it imply 
that  NATO  should  not  have  a  dialogue 
with third States. Obviously, all those that 
deploy forces on operations are entitled to 
“a  structural  role  in  shaping  strategy  and 
decisions on NATO-led missions to which 
they  contribute”.  Perhaps  NATO  might 
even  “develop  political  dialogue  and 
practical cooperation with any nations and 
relevant organizations across the globe that 
share our interest in peaceful international 
relations”  (SC  §30).  As  long,  that  is,  as 
NATO realizes that it cannot be the main 
forum  through  which  Europeans  and 
Americans  channel  their  relations  with 
States  such  as  China,  India,  or  Brazil,  or 
even Russia. 
The simple reason is best expressed by one 
of  NATO’s  own  buzzwords:  the 
comprehensive  approach.  NATO  is  a 
politico-military  organization,  which  deals 
with one dimension of foreign policy only, 
i.e.  security  and  defence.  Responses  to 
global  challenges  and  relations  with  third 
States  require  a  much  broader, 
comprehensive approach that encompasses 
all of foreign policy, from aid and trade to 
diplomacy and the military. While NATO 
can contribute, it is not equipped to take 
the lead. That is up to the governments of 
its members, including notably the United 
States  and  those  members  and  non-
members  that  happen  to  have  organized 
themselves into the European Union. The 
US  and  the  EU:  those  are  the  true, 
comprehensive  foreign  policy  actors  in 
Europe  and  North  America.  The  EU’s 
foreign  policy  institutions  were  greatly 
strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty, which 
entered  into  force  on  1  December  2009, 
and  in  Lisbon,  back-to-back  with  the 
NATO Summit, the EU’s new President of 
the  European  Council  met  with  the 
President of the US for bilateral talks. In 
an  age  where,  fortunately,  foreign  policy 
challenges outweigh direct security threats, 
the EU and the US, and direct consultation 
between them, logically take centre stage.  
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FOCUSING  ON  THE  “HARD”  CORE 
BUSINESS 
 
NATO  must  continue  to  play  a  leading 
role,  by  contrast,  in  what  constitutes  its 
core  business:  “hard  security”,  both 
defence against threats to our territory and 
global military crisis management. Here lies 
the  strength  and  the  continued  relevance 
of the Alliance. 
If today there are no more vital threats to 
Alliance  territory,  it  cannot  be  excluded 
that in the long term NATO will again see 
a major threat arise, or may have to ward 
off  the  consequences  of  inter-State  war 
between other powers. To that end, Article 
5 functions as the ultimate insurance. The 
call,  particularly  from  East  European 
Allies,  to  reconfirm  Article  5  is 
understandable  and  legitimate,  hence  the 
firm  statement:  “NATO  members  will 
always assist each other against attack” (SC 
§4). The credibility of this commitment is 
not helped by those who seek to expand 
the scope of Article 5, however. What does 
the  reference  to  “emerging  security 
challenges”  (SC  §4)  mean?    The  North 
Atlantic Treaty is clear: “an armed attack 
against  one  or  more  […]  shall  be 
considered  an  attack  against  them  all”. 
Once  one  starts  to  add  other  types  of 
contingencies  than  armed  attack,  such  as 
energy  or  cyber  security,  a  grey  zone 
quickly  emerges,  making  it  more  difficult 
to  decide  what  constitutes  sufficient 
ground to invoke Article 5. For how long 
must the gas be cut e.g. — a day, a week, a 
month?  How  to  react  to  cyber  attacks 
perpetrated  by  fluid  collectives  of 
individuals,  some  of  them  under-age? 
Once more, the Alliance will not be kept 
relevant  by  trying  to  imagine  military 
responses  to  non-military  challenges: 
energy  security,  cyber  security,  even 
terrorism  are  best  tackled  by  a  holistic 
foreign  and  security  policy,  including 
notably the police and justice dimension, in 
the  framework  of  which  the  military 
instrument is but a last resort. 
In the absence of a vital threat, it can be 
doubted too whether missile defence of all 
Alliance  territory  constitutes  an 
indispensable and effective contribution to 
collective  defence.  The  actual  threat  of 
missile  attack  seems  limited  and  certainly 
not  markedly  higher  than  other  types  of 
threat  that  cannot  be  stopped  by  missile 
defence,  notably  terrorism,  currently  the 
only  direct  threat  of  violence  against  our 
citizens  on  Alliance  territory.  Would  not 
the  combination  of  deterrence  and  a 
proactive  foreign  policy  in  cooperation 
with other powers suffice to contain, and 
ideally come to a mutual agreement with 
those  States  that  acquire  a  significant 
missile capacity? As it is, the effectiveness 
of  missile  defence  technology  to  protect 
our entire territory remains very much in 
doubt,  while  the  financial  burden  will 
certainly  be  very  heavy.  At  the  moment 
though, that will mostly be carried by the 
US, which will contribute the actual missile 
defence  capability,  while  the  other  Allies 
will fund the required command & control 
system  for  an  amount  in  excess  of  €700 
million  over  10  years  (including  €200 
million  added  in  Lisbon  to  expand 
protection from troops deployed in theatre 
to Allied territory itself). Their contribution 
will  hopefully  remain  at  this  level,  for  in 
the wake of the financial crisis European 
Allies  would  better  focus  their  reduced 
defence budgets on generating deployable 
capabilities for crisis management. 
If  after  Afghanistan  the  appetite  to 
undertake  new  large-scale  operations  has 
surely  diminished,  Europe  and  North 
America will continue to have to engage in 
crisis management. For there will be crises 
in which vital interests are at stake, such as 
“the  vital  communication,  transport  and 
transit routes on which international trade, 
energy security and prosperity depend” (SC  
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§13).  Furthermore,  there  will  sadly  be 
instances of crimes against which Europe 
and North America have a “Responsibility 
to Protect” populations in the context of 
the collective security system of the United 
Nations.  Crisis  management  beyond  the 
North Atlantic area thus also forms part of 
NATO’s core business. 
However,  through  which  organization 
Europeans and Americans will act in which 
case  cannot  be  decided  beforehand: 
NATO,  the  EU’s  Common  Security  and 
Defence  Policy  (CSDP),  the  UN — t h e  
most  suitable  framework  for  military 
deployment will have to be selected on a 
case-by-case  basis.  On  occasions  when 
Europeans  and  Americans  both  want  to 
engage,  it  will  be  NATO.  But  on  other 
occasions,  Americans  might  have  other 
priorities than Europeans, or might already 
be  engaged  elsewhere,  or  for  political 
reasons NATO might be less welcome in a 
region. Alternatives are thus required, if we 
want to be able to act in every contingency 
and deploy forces in the quickest and safest 
manner.  The  CSDP  framework  too 
therefore must be completely operational, 
including a permanent command & control 
structure  that  allows  for  permanently 
ongoing  contingency  planning,  a  smooth 
planning  process  in  crisis  situations,  and 
the  conduct  of  all  types  of  crisis 
management operations, including combat 
missions  if  necessary.  As  the  NATO 
command  &  control  structure  is  being 
downsized  by  no  less  than  5,000  staff, 
nations would certainly be able to find the 
300 or so officers that would have to be 
seconded  to  the  EU  to  that  end.  At  the 
same time, a permanent EU capacity would 
be  a  lot  cheaper  for  those  three  EU 
Member  States  that  now  always  have  to 
multinationalize their national headquarters 
to run CSDP operations: France, Germany 
and the UK. 
In crisis management too, the primacy of 
foreign policy is uncontested. The military 
end-state aimed at by an operation is never 
an  end  in  itself,  but  a  step  towards  a 
comprehensive political end-state. That is 
decided upon by the foreign policy actors: 
the governments and, when the European 
governments concert (which ought always 
to be the case), the EU. Regardless of the 
framework in which European troops are 
deployed — NATO, CSDP or the UN — 
Europeans discuss the wider foreign policy 
objectives  in  the  EU  framework.  That  is 
the  case  for  Lebanon  e.g.,  in  the 
framework  of  the  European 
Neighbourhood  Policy,  even  though  the 
8,000 European soldiers are there as Blue 
Helmets,  under  UN  command.  It  is  the 
case for Kosovo, where European military 
are deployed under the NATO-flag. And it 
ought  to  be  the  case  much  more  for 
Afghanistan, if Europeans want to have an 
impact on strategy towards the country and 
the region. 
Crisis management requires capabilities. At 
the  Summit  NATO  adopted  the  Lisbon 
Capability Package, fixing the funding for a 
number  of  multinational  projects.  The 
boots on the ground however have to be 
provided by the nations. European Allies 
are still struggling to improve the efficiency 
of  their  defence  effort:  their  combined 
defence  budgets  ought  to  generate  much 
more deployable capabilities. But they do 
not,  because  in  reality  they  are  not 
combined —  the  problem  of  European 
defence  is  fragmentation.  The  answer  is 
integration:  a  combination  of 
specialization, pooling of efforts, and doing 
away  with  redundant  assets. T h e  a n s w e r ,  
furthermore,  is  Europe:  such  integration 
has  to,  and  can  only,  take  place  among 
Europeans — the US has no need to pool 
its military. Hence CSDP is the platform 
from  which  to  launch  a  stepped  up 
European defence effort. On 9 December 
2010, the Ministers of Defence of the EU  
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agreed on the so-called Ghent Framework, 
referring to their earlier informal meeting 
in  that  city  in  September.  Each  EU 
Member State will analyze its capabilities in 
order to identify: (1) those it will maintain 
on a national level; (2) those to which it 
will contribute through pooling with other 
Member States; and (3) those to which it 
will  no  longer  contribute,  relying  on 
specialization  and  role-sharing  between 
Member  States.  If  done  in  a  permanent 
and structured manner, such a process will 
lead to true cooperation — as envisaged by 
Permanent  Structured  Cooperation,  the 
new  defence  mechanism  in  the  Lisbon 
Treaty.  The  end-result  will  benefit 
everybody:  more  effective  forces,  no 
matter how integrated, will be available for 
national as well as CSDP, NATO and UN 
operations. 
AVOID “SOFT” BRANCHING-OUT 
 
Crisis  management  is  not  exclusively 
military.  In  Lisbon,  NATO  decided  to 
create “an appropriate but modest civilian 
crisis management capability” in order “to 
interface  more  effectively  with  civilian 
partners”, but it “may also be used to plan, 
employ  and  coordinate  civilian  activities 
until  conditions  allow  for  the  transfer  of 
those  responsibilities  and  tasks  to  other 
actors”  (SC  §25).  Undoubtedly,  the 
“interface”  is  highly  necessary.  An 
arrangement  is  needed  that,  whenever 
NATO is chosen as the framework for a 
military  operation,  allows  from  the  very 
start  for  the  involvement  in  NATO 
planning  of  whichever  actor  will  take 
charge of the political, social and economic 
tasks, be it the EU or the UN. These can 
then  implement  those  tasks  in  full 
coordination with the military — but under 
their  own  command.  Once  more,  the 
primacy  of  foreign  policy  must  be 
recognized. The highest political authority, 
which will set the comprehensive foreign 
policy  strategy  towards  the  country 
concerned, will always lie outside NATO, 
with the US and the EU, and finally with 
the  UN.  It  is  not  up  to  NATO  to 
command  the  various  civilian  dimensions 
of this comprehensive strategy. 
The  added  value  of  creating  a  NATO 
capacity to “plan, employ and coordinate” 
civilian tasks is doubtful therefore. Certain 
civilian  tasks  will  in  any  case  have  to  be 
implemented  from  the  start, 
simultaneously  with  military  operations. 
That civilian capacity will in any case have 
to  be  provided  by  nations  (e.g.  police, 
gendarmerie,  civil  protection),  by  other 
international organizations (notably various 
UN agencies), and by NGOs, and will in 
any  case  require  military  protection. 
Building  a  NATO  “civilian  HQ”  would 
duplicate  existing  civilian  command  & 
control  structures,  notably  the  EU’s 
Civilian  Planning  and  Conduct  Capacity 
(CPCC),  without  adding  more  capability. 
More importantly, this would be a useless 
duplication,  for  even  if  initially  NATO 
itself  would  conduct  some  civilian  tasks, 
eventually the other actors will always need 
to  come  in —  certainly  the  Alliance  will 
not  create  a  development  policy,  a  trade 
policy etc. Better then to leave the short 
term (i.e. civilian crisis management stricto 
sensu) and the long-term civilian dimension 
in the same hands. Nor would it be very 
useful  then  to  “identify  and  train  civilian 
specialists from member states” (SC §25). 
There already exists a plethora of national, 
EU  and  UN  courses  for  civilian  crisis 
management. The problem is not how to 
train policemen, judges etc. for deployment 
abroad — the issue is where to find them.  
CONCLUSION 
 
NATO remains the forum where Europe 
and  North  America  organize  their 
collective  defence,  and  it  remains  one  of 
the key actors through which they do crisis 
management  and  cooperative  security.  
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Those are the three “essential core tasks” 
defined by the new Strategic Concept (§4). 
The  more  capable  NATO  will  be  of 
implementing  those  security  and  defence 
tasks, the more relevant it will be. Attempts 
to broaden NATO’s agenda beyond those 
core  tasks  and  move  into  civilian  crisis 
management and even into foreign policy 
cannot achieve success, for the Alliance is 
an  alliance,  not  a  foreign  policy  actor. 
Instead, such distractions will only serve to 
undermine  the  core  tasks  and  thus  to 
question  NATO’s  relevance.  What  this 
artificial broadening of the agenda will not 
do is bring back the centrality that NATO 
enjoyed during the Cold War. Fortunately, 
for to put it simply, that today the agenda 
of Europe and North America is no longer 
dominated  by  a  vital  threat  to  their 
territory is a good thing. 
NATO’s loss of centrality does not affect 
the transatlantic relationship, however, for 
we  should  not  make  the  mistake  of 
equating transatlantic relations with NATO 
only. Logically, if defence is no longer the 
main  concern,  the  main  debate  moves 
elsewhere, particularly to the direct EU-US 
relationship.  That  transatlantic  link, 
between  the  two  fully-fledged  foreign 
policy  actors,  needs  to  be  deepened  and 
operationalized.  Within  such  a 
fundamental  political  partnership,  NATO 
remains  a  key  asset,  the  executive 
organization  that  Europeans  and 
Americans  use  when  they  need  to  act 
together in the military field. Let us hope 
that  an  effective  foreign  policy  can  limit 
those occasions as much as possible. 
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